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Abstract 
 
The Dutch regulatory process for setting the first X-Factors in the electricity distribution sector 
has gone badly wrong. During two-and-a-half years four different X-Factors were published by 
the regulator. These X-Factors fluctuated wildly. We demonstrate that Dutch electricity 
consumers will pay at least €300mln. more over three years for the distribution of electricity than 
might otherwise have been the case. We estimate that benefits for the companies in terms of extra 
revenue from lowered X-Factors amounts to 3~5 percent of total asset value. We provide a history 
of the regulatory process and analyse the impact of the different X-Factors on the final bills of 
consumers. The negative political reaction to the perceived problems of regulation has hampered 
the course of deregulation and the privatisation of the municipally-owned electricity companies. 
The Minister of Economic Affairs and the majority of Parliament want the complete ownership 
unbundling of the sector by 1 January 2007.   
 
                                                                 
* The authors would like to thank the comments of Liz Hooper, Jacques de Jong, David Newbery, JanErik Janssen, and Jan-
Willem Velthuijsen. Any remaining errors are the responsibility of the authors.  
1 The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
2  This author was an advisor to the DTe in the initial phases of regulation (1999), later advising several of the companies on 
regulatory strategy. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The price control review has become a key element of independent economic 
regulation of network utilities around the world in recent years. Once every 3 to 5 years the 
regulatory agency responsible for setting prices for monopoly network companies in 
telecoms, electricity, gas, water, railways or airports deliberates on what the maximum prices 
for these services should be, and sets them for the upcoming control period. The process 
pioneered in recent years by the Office of Telecommunications Services (Oftel) in the UK can 
be expected to take up to 18 months from the publication of the first consultation document 
to the publication of the final prices.  
 
Many countries around the world now have such an approach to electricity 
regulation in the wake of privatisation and deregulation of electricity generation and the 
gradual opening up to competition of final markets for electricity supply (or retail). Jamasb 
and Pollitt (2001) in a survey of 23 OECD and leading developing countries found that 13 
countries had price control periods of 3 to 5 years. The approach contrasts sharply with the 
previous regime under public ownership where there was an annual determination of prices 
by the relevant government ministry following a more or less formal process of internal 
consultation between the ministry and the companies it regulated. In the US Sappington et al. 
(2001) found that at least 16 out of 50 US states had introduced some form of multiyear price 
control (often amounting to a nominal rate freeze for domestic customers) as opposed to the 
traditional third party initiated rate review. Multi-year price caps in the US differ crucially 
from those in other countries in that they are voluntary agreements between firms and 
regulators and lack statutory backing. The new approach has the advantages of transparency 
and increased investor and consumer certainty about the future path of prices.3 
 
The Netherlands adopted this approach to economic regulation of its electricity 
distribution and transmission network companies in 1998. Originally the first price control 
period was to be from 1 January 2001 to 31 December 2003. The first consultation document 
for this price control review period was published in July 1999 (DTe, 1999). However the 
process has gone badly wrong. The Dutch energy regulator (DTe) published four different X-
Factors during a period of two-and-a-half years, these X-Factors fluctuated substantially. 
Two major court cases before the industrial tribunal (CBb) were lost by the DTe regarding 
                                                                 
3 See Nillesen & Pollitt (2001) for a firm-specific response to the threat of regulation in Florida. 
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the interpretation of the Electricity Act. The Final X-Factors were significantly lower than the 
initial proposed X-Factors.  
 
Final prices for the first regulatory period were only agreed in May 2003.4 This was 
almost two-and-half years after they were due to be implemented. Furthermore, the May 
2003 agreement sets prices to 31 December 2006, signalling that there would be no proper 
review of prices for the second price control period, which was originally envisaged to begin 
on 1 January 2004. The agreement which includes an adjustment for the period from 1 
January 2001, however does consist of two separate regulatory periods, with the second 
regulatory period subject to a different regulatory regime known as yardstick competition, 
and the possibility of ex post re-calculation of the average X-Factors in the second period. 
 
The cost – to consumers and ultimately shareholders - of this failure to implement 
price controls as originally envisaged has been high. In this paper we present an analysis that 
attempts to quantify the costs of this regulatory failure. We demonstrate that Dutch 
electricity consumers will pay at least €300mln. more over three years for the distribution of 
electricity than might otherwise have been the case. Meanwhile the largest company, Essent, 
has ended up having its revenue reduced by almost €128mln. less than it might have done. 
In addition, the Dutch legislature has spent a considerable amount of time debating 
appropriate responses to this regulatory failure and the setbacks experienced during the 
liberalisation of the market. Meanwhile other problems have beset the sector. The opening of 
the market for business customers per 1 January 2002 was accompanied by substantial 
administrative problems, related to billing and the accuracy of meter reading. Furthermore, 
the bankruptcy of EnergyXS (a new entrant) during the summer of 2003 demonstrated the 
fragility of the regulatory framework and showed some potential caveats in legislation. 
Therefore, although the regulatory failure we discuss has contributed to calls for tighter 
legislation, the proposed amendments were not solely instigated by the X-Factor changes. In 
the evaluation of the Electricity Act in 2002 (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2002) three areas 
of concern were discussed: (i) regulation, (ii) security of supply, and (iii) prices or tariffs. The 
Minister concluded that non-discriminatory access to the networks was functioning 
properly. The Minister further intended to clarify the role and responsibility of DTe and 
announced that DTe would grow from 15 fulltime equivalent employees (FTE) to 55 FTE. 
Thus a strengthening of the regulatory framework would be desirable. 
                                                                 
4 DTe (2003c), De Overeenkomst Regulering Nettarieven Elektriciteit (2001-2006), 26 May 2003, The Hague.  
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Recently (29 June 2004) a Bill (“Interventiewet”) passed through parliament that will 
tighten the regulatory framework substantially including the possibility of fines and further 
unbundling steps to ensure the independence of the distribution network operator.5 In the 
short run the negative political reaction to the perceived problems of regulation has 
hampered the course of deregulation and the privatisation of the electricity network 
companies, that remain (with the exception of two small gas-only companies) municipally-
owned. In addition to this it is the Minister’s intention to fully unbundle the existing energy 
companies at ownership level into a regulated network company and a commercial 
company.6 
 
In what follows we seek to document the course of the price review for the period 
2001-2003. We provide an analysis of the effects of different stages of the review on customer 
bills and the consequences for consumer welfare. We also conclude by discussing what can 
be learned from this episode by regulators and legislators around the world. We suggest that 
although the network companies may have got the better of the regulator during the current 
price control period the longer-term consequences of such a “win” could be seriously 
negative. As such, “beating” the regulator may provoke a reaction from the regulator or 
legislator that is more severe than the “win” (such as the proposed forced ownership 
unbundling). This is because regulated firms may exploit any given rules of the regulation 
game to their advantage but the government always has the power to change the rules of the 
game to ensure a politically acceptable outcome. The danger in this for regulated companies 
is that the negative reaction they provoke may lead to a worse outcome than if they had not 
exploited the original rules. Society is almost always the loser in situations such as these, as 
real resources are consumed in the regulatory battles over prices, uncertainty is increased 
and subsequent regulation is likely to be overly draconian. We begin our story with a 
discussion of the principles of economic regulation. 
 
II. Regulation 
 
Asymmetric information between the regulator and the regulated firm is a key issue in 
the regulation of natural monopolies. Baron and Myerson (1982) and Laffont and Tirole 
(1986) address regulation of monopoly firms in the presence of asymmetric information in 
                                                                 
5 Ministry of Economic Affairs (2004), Wetsvoorstel “Wijziging Elektriciteitswet 1998 en Gaswet in verband met implementatie 
en aanscherping toezicht netbeheer” (29 372), The Hague.  
6 Ministry of Economic Affairs (2004), Vision on the Future Structure of the Energy Market, 31 March 2004, The Hague. 
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the form of unknown costs and unobservable effort to reduce costs.7 A rather common 
criticism of the rate-of-return (ROR) regulation model is that it lacks incentives for efficiency 
improvements and encourages firms to engage in strategic behaviour. Averch and Johnson 
(1962) showed that ROR regulation encourages utilities to inflate their regulatory asset base 
through over-investment and socially-inefficient resource allocation. The argument finds 
some parallels in the US power sector in the 1970s and 1980s where stranded costs of over-
investment in generation capacity contributed to electricity price increases and, 
consequently, the calls for restructuring of the sector in the high-price states (Joskow, 1997). 
 
Regulatory reform of network industries around the world has challenged the 
traditional ROR regulation, as regulators have adopted a variety of incentive-based models. 
These models aim to provide monopolies with the incentive to utilise their exclusive 
information on effort and costs, to improve operating efficiency and investment decisions, 
and to ensure that consumers benefit from the efficiency gains.8 In the US, incentive-based 
regulation is generally termed Performance-Based Regulation or Rate-Making (PBR). This 
interest in incentive regulation is not due to new contributions from economic theory, rather, 
it reflects the need and desire for new practical approaches to regulation, even though these 
may not always be fully in line with theory. It was also partly prompted by the success of 
incentive regulation in Britain. (Crew and Kleindorfer, 1996, p. 215). 
 
Outside the US, incentive based regulation is synonymous with RPI-X (or CPI-X) 
regulation, as first suggested by Littlechild (1983). Such price cap regulation usually allows 
average prices (or revenue) to rise by the rate of inflation minus an efficiency factor (X), 
which reflects the potential for relative productivity improvement in the regulated firm. 
Under both PBR and RPI-X companies retain extra profits made under the control formula.9 
Price-cap regulation decouples profits from costs by setting maximum prices for the duration 
of a specific period (or regulatory lag).  
 
An important feature of incentive regulation is the use of benchmarking, which can be 
broadly defined as the comparison of a firm’s actual performance against some pre-defined reference 
or benchmark performance. A perceived advantage of benchmarking has been that it reduces 
                                                                 
7 See also Armstrong, Cowan, and Vickers (1994) for a review of these models. 
8 See Joskow and Schmalensee (1986) for a discussion of the main approaches to incentive regulation of electric utilities. 
9 For the purposes of this study, unless specified, we do not differentiate between a price and a revenue cap regulation based on 
the CPI-X formula. 
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the information asymmetry problem that occurs in ROR regulation by reducing the 
regulator’s reliance on the firm’s own costs, but references the price to an external non-
influencable benchmark. 
 
The most contentious issue in price-cap regulation is the basis for determining 
efficiency improvements and the translation of these into tariff changes (X-Factors). 
Regulators have adopted a variety of benchmarking methods to arrive at X-Factors. The 
main approaches can be divided into two types: (i) frontier-based and (ii) non-frontier 
techniques.10 This division also reflects the divide in benchmarking approaches used by, on 
the one hand, the European and Australian electricity regulators, and the Public Utility 
Commissions (PUC) in the United States on the other. The European regulators have 
generally adopted frontier-based benchmarking methods as the basis on which to calculate 
the X-Factors. The PUCs that have adopted PBR have tended to use industry wide 
productivity measures such as Total Factor Productivity (TFP) to calculate the efficiency 
requirements (see Jamasb and Pollitt, 2001).  
 
Frontier-based methods 
 
In frontier-based benchmarking, the relative performance of a firm is measured in the 
form of efficiency scores on a scale of 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest) against the best practice or 
efficient frontier of a sample of firms. Regulators then work out procedures for translating 
the efficiency scores into X-Factors and setting initial prices for the rate period in question. 
The procedures that translate scores into tariffs and X-Factors reflect the different objectives 
of regulators, such as speed of decisions, level of efficiency drive, or detail of output 
steering.11 The most widely used frontier-based benchmarking methods are Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA), Corrected Ordinary Least Square (COLS), and Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis (SFA). DEA is non-parametric and identifies the efficient frontier using a 
linear programming technique. In DEA, the relative efficiency of a firm is computed (rather 
than estimated) on a scale of 0 to 1 relative to best practice or to a sample of efficient firms.  
 
COLS and SFA are statistical techniques that estimate the efficiency score of a firm 
relative to an efficient frontier. Both techniques require the specification of a production or 
                                                                 
10 The review of the methods in this section is based on Jamasb and Pollitt (2001) and Pollitt (1995). See also Coelli, Rap, and 
Battese (1998) and DTe (1999). 
11 See Jamasb and Pollitt (2001) for some examples. 
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cost function. Similar to DEA, the COLS technique assigns all deviation from the frontier to 
inefficiency. The efficiency scores calculated using COLS are therefore sensitive to the 
position of the frontier firms. SFA recognises the possibility of stochastic errors in the 
measurement of the inefficiencies. If there are no inefficiency measurement errors in the 
sample, the error assumption would result in some inefficiency being regarded as noise. 
Essentially, a part of the relative inefficiency is attributed to stochastic elements in the data 
rather than to the inefficient operation of the firm. Consequently, due to the measurement 
error factor, the SFA scores are likely to be higher than those measured by COLS. 
 
Non-Frontier Methods  
 
Andrei Shleifer (1985) suggested that if a group of regulated utilities in the same 
industry had access to the same technology that they should be subject to “yardstick” 
competition. This involves setting an identical price, or over time an identical X-Factor for 
each firm. The feature of yardstick competition that ensures optimal incentives is that the 
yardstick price should bear no relation to the actual costs of the given regulated firm. Thus, 
using the change in a general productivity index, as the basis for the X-Factor would 
approximately satisfy this condition. A number of yardstick approaches have been 
suggested. The most widely used benchmarking technique in non-frontier approaches is 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP). The method can, for example, use the Tornqvist index as a 
measure of historical productivity growth of the individual firm (internal benchmarking), the 
electricity sector (domestic or international), or the whole economy when setting the X-Factor 
in incentive regulation (see e.g. Coelli, Rap, and Battese, 1998). In either case, a simple 
Tornqvist TFP index can be expressed in terms of: 
 
TFP = (output index) / (input index)       (1) 
 
The Tornqvist input quantity requires information on quantity and cost share of inputs 
for the two periods for which the productivity change is calculated. Equation (2) shows the 
Tornqvist input quantity index from the base period S to period t. The output index is 
calculated in a similar way. 
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where: 
? is  cost share of i-th input in period s 
xit  quantity of i-th input in period t 
 
The implementation of TFP-related X-Factors for regulatory purposes is relatively easy, 
but the information requirement of the approach is non-trivial. Also, a potential weakness of 
the approach is that less efficient firms may find it easier than efficient firms to outperform 
the TFP measure and earn large profits. 
 
In yardstick regulation, the mean of the costs of a peer group of firms can also serve as 
the benchmark for individual firms. In this approach, all the firms in the group are subject to 
the same price cap.12 Such an approach has been implemented in Japan among regional 
electricity supply companies (see Hattori et al., 2002). Another yardstick method has been 
used by the National Energy Commission (CNE) in Chile to calculate the value-added for the 
distribution services. The value-added for a group of comparable firms is derived from a 
designed efficient model or reference firm (see e.g. Rudnick and Donoso, 2000; Rudnick and 
Rainari, 1997). In Spain, the regulator has used model firms for specific geographical areas to 
allocate a portion of the total system revenues among distribution utilities. 
 
Also, the sliding scale method (as used by the California PUC) can be viewed as a form 
of average benchmarking where the target ROR in the dead-band is intended to represent a 
fair rate of return based on the return earned by comparable industries or firms in similar 
operating environments. The regulated utility is, therefore, competing with the average 
performance in the industry or economy. 
 
 
 
                                                                 
12 The Dutch energy regulator DTe, intends to implement a generic X-Factor method in the current regulatory period that 
started in 2004. The generic X-Factor will be based on the productivity growth of the frontier firms. See DTe (2002b) for a 
detailed description of the proposed methodology for this current (second) period. 
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Other firm specific benchmarking methods  
 
The Norwegian Water and Energy Administration (NVE) has used the Value Chain 
Model (VCM) for one-to-one benchmarking of the state-owned central transmission utility 
Statnett against the Swedish national grid company Svenska Kraftnät. The model allows for 
the adjustment of data to account for operational and environmental factors.13 There are also 
partial benchmarking approaches, such as the method applied in the study of electricity 
distribution utilities in the state of Victoria, Australia (see UMS, 1999). The method assumes 
separability of different cost categories and involves the comparison of firms of different 
scales. This drawback is potentially mitigated when the firms have similar technologies and 
scale. Finally, targeted incentive schemes can use average or frontier performance 
benchmarks to address specific aspects of operations of firms. These benchmarks may be 
based on the past or expected performance of the firm or industry. These have been 
particularly applied to quality benchmarks where firm specific quality standards for outages 
and accidents are widely used (e.g. for Southern California Edison see Jamasb and Pollitt, 
2001). 
 
Which technique is best? 
 
From a regulatory policy point of view, a major difference between the frontier and 
average benchmarking is that the former has a stronger focus on performance variations 
between firms. Frontier methods appear suitable at initial stages of regulatory reform when a 
primary objective is to reduce the performance gap among the utilities through firm-specific 
efficiency requirements. Average benchmarking methods may be used to mimic competition 
among firms with relatively similar costs, or where there is a lack of sufficient data and 
comparators for the application of frontier methods.  
 
It should be noted that there is an important methodological difference between 
frontier and TFP-based approaches to efficiency measurement. In the frontier-based 
approach, a relative efficiency score is measured for each firm relative to the efficient 
frontier. This results in a direct inter-dependence between a firm’s efficiency measure (score) 
and the potential strategic behaviour of frontier firms in the sample. In the index number 
                                                                 
13 See Magnus and Midttun (2000) for a brief description of the method. 
 10 
approach to TFP at sector level, each firm’s benchmark is the same and can only be 
marginally affected by its own or other firms’ strategic behaviour. 
 
Setting the X-Factor – interaction with the regulated firm 
 
In principle, the aim of benchmarking within incentive regulation is to exploit the 
efficiency improvement potential of the regulated firm. Regulators should recognise that 
their benchmarking exercise inevitably shapes the efforts, and directs considerable resources, 
of the firms towards the make up and variables of these models. However, while 
benchmarking can measure “true” performance improvements, gaming can sometimes 
produce illusive or “virtual” efficiency improvements. Therefore, benchmarking models 
need to strike a balance between reflecting the main performance drivers of the business in 
question and reducing incentives for engaging in unproductive method or model-induced 
strategic behaviour. 
 
This type of behaviour is rational from a firm’s perspective. Optimising the regulatory 
process and exploiting the information advantage will maximise profits for shareholders. In 
cases where customers are, directly or indirectly, shareholders (e.g. co-operatives or mutuals 
in the strict sense, or municipal-owned), the firm’s excess profits might still benefit the local 
consumer.14 However, where customers have no relation with the capital of the firm, such 
regulatory strategies are likely to lead to welfare losses for consumers. 
 
Regulated firms may attempt to influence the use of regulation benchmarking at the 
adoption stage. Although these efforts may not be considered as gaming, utilities may 
attempt to influence: (i) the use of benchmarking in incentive regulation, (ii) the choice of 
method, model, and variables (and their weighting), (iii) the definition of variables adopted 
during the consultation process, and (iv) the translation of efficiency scores into X-Factors. At 
a later stage, firms may use gaming strategies to benefit from the regulator’s adopted 
benchmarking model. 
 
Some regulation games are associated with the periodic aspect of ROR and incentive 
based regulatory reviews through timing of specific types of actions. Dynamic aspects of 
                                                                 
14 In the case of co-operatives, the alignment of the interests of customers and owners reduces the need for regulatory 
intervention (Ofwat 2000). Electricity co-operatives are common in the USA. Regulators in Florida, Indiana, Maine, and 
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strategic behaviour of the firm associated with regulatory lag are known to regulators, and 
have been addressed by some authors (see e.g. Baumol and Klevoric, 1970; Sappington, 
1980). Di Tella and Dyck (2002), in a study of the Chilean electricity distribution utilities 
under price cap regulation, report evidence of cyclical cost reductions that coincide with the 
initial years of rate periods, and the reverse prior to the next rate review. 
 
Gaming behaviour is not only limited to private firms. Publicly-owned firms can also 
be motivated to pursue monetary or other performance measures. Several countries noted 
for the use of benchmarking, including The Netherlands, Norway, and Australia, have 
significant municipal or state ownership. Courty and Marschke (2002), in a study of job 
training agencies, show that public organisations can engage in gaming by timing their 
performance reports in order to benefit from awards. They show that performance incentives 
can come at a cost by having a negative effect on efficiency.  
 
Broadly, it is possible to differentiate between two types of strategic behaviour. The 
first is behaviour that may not have a material effect on the efficient operation of the firm 
and is intended to present the performance of the firm in a more favourable light. For 
example, a firm may shift costs from operating to capital costs, or influence the choice of 
output variables in order to affect measured relative performance. The main undesirable 
outcome of such virtual efficiencies is that they result in welfare transfer from customers, or 
even other firms, to the gaming firm through lower efficiency targets than the true 
underlying efficiency would suggest. 
 
The second type of gaming is in the form of behaviour that distorts the efficient 
operation and investment decisions of the firm. For example, the firm might increase its cost 
base or delay efficiency improvements in periods leading to a new rate case. This type of 
gaming results in socially inefficient resource allocation and dead-weight loss. An important 
concern with both of these gaming categories in frontier-based approaches is that, due to the 
inter-dependency between the efficiency scores, a firm’s gaming can also affect the measured 
performance of other firms. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Mississippi do not regulate the rates co-operatives charge. For a discussion of the performance of these co-operatives see 
Hansmann (1988). 
 12 
Gaming behaviour is therefore not only isolated to ROR systems but can be found to 
exist in incentive-based regulatory frameworks.15 In the next section we discuss the Dutch 
approach to regulating the electricity sector.  
 
III. Electricity and regulation in The Netherlands 
 
The Dutch electricity and gas distribution sector is predominantly in public 
ownership (the exception being two small gas companies owned by Germany’s RWE). 
Following a wave of consolidation during the 1990s, there are now three large vertically-
integrated energy distribution companies, with a combined market share of 94 percent (total 
number of customers approximately 7.3 million). Nuon and Essent are roughly equal with 
market shares of 33 percent (both also have generation assets16), and Eneco has around 25 
percent market share following its purchase on the fourth-largest energy company REMU in 
December 2002. For the purposes of this paper we focus on these three companies when 
discussing the events of the first regulatory period.17 Figure.1 shows the different coloured 
areas where Nuon, Essent, and Eneco operate.  
 
Source: EnergieNed 
 
The existing shareholders, as well as the management of the companies, are keen to 
privatise. For the municipal shareholders this would be a welcome release of capital. It 
                                                                 
15 For a detailed discussion of gaming see for example, Jamasb, Nillesen & Pollitt (2003a,b). 
16 Nuon recently completed the purchase of Reliant’s UNA assets in December 2003. 
17 There are actually 20 separate legal entities that act as network operators but are owned by the same holding company. We 
have therefore merged these firms into three main network operators: Eneco, Essent, and Nuon. The X-Factors are therefore the 
effective X-Factor deduced from the required cost savings of each separate entity. 
Nuon
Eneco
Essent
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would also make for more efficient local government, freeing the municipalities from 
oversight of commercial market activities, such as generation and retail. For the 
management, privatisation will allow the companies to grow internationally via merger with 
one of the remaining European players.  
 
Although privatisation was initially allowed, an amendment to the Electricity Act, 
placed a moratorium on privatisation until at least six months after full market liberalisation 
– on 1 July 2004.18 The privatisation discussion is still a hot topic for debate. The history of 
the DTe and X-Factors we sketch below are the background to these discussions. The current 
focus in Parliament is on the Interventiewet, this Act will substantially strengthen the powers 
of the regulator. The content of this Act is partly the result of the regulatory failings we 
describe below. However, the Act’s contents do not go far enough for certain parties, which 
are arguing for the complete separation of networks from retail and a ban on privatising this 
vital infrastructure. The Minister for Economic Affairs recently presented his vision for the 
energy sector.19 Next to the tougher regulatory regime, the Minister intends to fully separate 
the networks from the commercial activities. This is to be effective by 1 January 2007. The 
Minister states that the separation will benefit customers, by creating a level playing field 
with new entrants that do not own networks, avoid potential abuse of the natural 
monopolistic position that these networks enjoy, and will allow the networks to remain in 
public hands should the companies be privatised. Importantly, the Minister also states that 
this will facilitate regulation by DTe. We return to the impact of this in our conclusion. 
However, we begin by setting out the history of the first regulatory period. 
 
The setting of the X-Factor 
 
The liberalisation of the Dutch energy sector follows the long and drawn-out process 
of agreeing the EU Electricity Directive and EU Gas Directive in the middle of 1996 and 
middle of 1998 respectively.20 The Directive for electricity was implemented in The 
                                                                 
18 Spain’s Endesa actually acquired REMU and NRE in December 2000, but could not get Ministerial approval for the 
transaction – the Parliamentary compromise was to allow a sale of the “economic” ownership, but not the “legal” ownership. 
This was not attractive for Endesa and they subsequently withdrew. However, RWE did manage to find a construction that 
satisfied the Minister of Economic Affairs and acquired Obragas and Haarlemmermeer. 
19 Ministry of Economic Affairs (2004), Vision on the Future Structure of the Energy Market, 31 March 2004, The Hague. 
20 Directives nr. 96/92/EC and 98/30/EC. In the summer of 2003 two new Directives nr. 2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC were 
agreed that altered the original Guidelines and were meant to be implemented before July 2004. Under these Directives all 
business customers shouldl be free to choose their supplier from 1 July 2004 and all residential customers from 1 July 2007. It 
also requires legal unbundling for transmission by 1 July 2004 and by 1 July 2007 for distribution. It foresees regulated Third 
Party Access and requires each country to establish a regulator (Germany has been the exception in the EU). 
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Netherlands with the enactment of the Electricity Act 1998 (or E-Act).21 The discussion below 
draws heavily on the detailed summary of events from a more legal perspective by Janssen & 
Pigmans (2004). 
 
The E-Act set-up a regulator and required the integrated energy companies to split 
their tariffs into a retail and network component. This split was to take effect in 2000 and was 
to be based on the integrated tariffs of the companies in 1996 (1996=2000 principle). The 
network tariffs were differentiated between the various voltage levels using the “cascade” 
principle, where consumers pay for all the voltage levels they use. Thus, a residential 
customer pays for the low voltage grid and part of mid and higher voltage grids, whereas a 
high voltage customer only pays for the high voltage grid. 
 
The E-Act also requires the regulator to set X-Factors for the companies. The X-
Factors are set for a regulatory period, which can vary between three to five years (initially 3 
years). The formula for adjusting the tariffs is CPI-X (similar to RPI-X). The companies are 
allowed to adjust their tariffs by the Consumer Price Index (CPI), whilst simultaneously 
adjusting their tariffs with the X-Factor. 
 
On 1 August 1998 the Dienst uitvoering en Toezicht energie (DTe) was set up (and 
later to become a separate chamber of the Dutch competition authority NMa). In July 1999 
the DTe published its first consultation document Price Cap Regulation in the Electricity 
Sector22. The procedure followed by the DTe allowed companies to provide input into the 
consultation document, after which the DTe published its methodology and subsequently 
the X-Factor decisions. Relevant parties could then appeal against these decisions at the DTe. 
The final appeal procedure was to proceed to a special tribunal for business (College van 
Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven, CBb).  
 
As well as specifying that the first regulatory period would be for three calender 
years (2001-2003) the 1999 consultation document further stated that: 
 
“It is the DTe’s remit to formulate sensible rules and incentives aimed at enabling the 
latter category of actors [network operators] to perform fairly, safely and with 
                                                                 
21 Ministry of Economic Affairs (2003a), Wet van 2 juli 1998, houdende regels met betrekking tot de productie, het transport en 
de levering van elektriciteit (Elektriciteitswet 1998) (Stb. 2003, 235), The Hague.  
22 DTe (1999), Price Cap Regulation in the Electricity Sector, Information and Consultation Document, July 1999, The Hague. 
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maximum efficiency as well as monitor the proper implementation of regulations and 
ascertain whether the incentives are having the appropriate effect.” (DTe, 1999, p.4) 
 
In the document the DTe sets out its basic principles: (i) 1996=2000 where the tariffs 
set for 2000 should be based on the tariffs in 1996 (adjusted for volume growth), (ii) output 
steering (light-handed regulation) and the use of comparative benchmarking, and (iii) 
regulation to be developed within the context of an internationalisation of the energy sector 
and the (possible) privatisation of municipal-owned companies. 
 
The DTe’s approach to the comparative benchmarking exercise was to be based on 
“the principle of using different methodologies to cross-check each other…” .23 However, when the 
Guidelines for Price Cap Regulation of the Dutch Electricity Sector24 were published in February 
2000, it became clear that the DTe had opted to only use DEA.25 The fear within the sector 
was that the DTe would direcly translate the efficiency results into X-Factors. To counter 
these fears the DTe stated that: 
 
“…, it is important to stress that DTe is not proposing to adopt a mechanistic 
approach to the determination of X-Factors for the companies, based solely on 
efficiency scores from a benchmarking exercise.” (DTe 2000c, p.4) 
 
Nevertheless, when the DTe published its first X-Factors in September 2000 for the 
sector it incorporated a substantial narrowing of the approach to translating efficiency scores 
into X-Factors.  26 Firstly, although the DTe capped the X-Factors at 8 percent, it did apply the 
efficiency scores directly to the standardised cost of the companies. The efficiency scores 
were not cross-checked with other methods, neither were the companies grouped into 
different categories, such as for example top perfomers, average, and poor performers, thus 
making no allowance for stochastic factors below the 8 percent cap, measurement error or 
misspecification of inputs and outputs. Secondly, the DTe applied the efficiency scores to 
total cost (including capital costs but (initially) excluding non-controllable costs, such as TSO 
                                                                 
23 DTe (1999), op. cit., page 24. 
24 DTe (2000b), Guidelines for Price Cap Regulation of the Dutch Electricity Sector, February 2000, The Hague. 
25 The DTe used a Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) DEA model, arguing that companies were in control of the optimal scale by 
being able to merge or de-merge. The model has total standardised cost as input factor and number of customers (small/large), kWh 
transmitted , number of transformers, maximum simultaneous demand (distribution/transmission) , and network length as output factors. 
For a discussion of the benchmarking methods see Jamasb and Pollitt (2001).  
26 DTe (2000a), Besluit, houdende vaststelling van de factor Xt, bedoeld in Artikel 41 van de Elektriciteitswet 1998, (one for each 
individual network operator), The Hague, 22 september 2000. 
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charges), as opposed to just operational expenditure as it had been discussing with the 
sector. 
 
In order to compare the outcomes of the various X-Factors we calculate the 
cumulative change in allowed revenues – discounted using the regulated return (6.6 percent) 
- for the three-year period. Because Nuon, Essent, and Eneco consist of many smaller 
network operators we re-calculate the effective X-Factor by comparing total starting revenue 
with final allowed revenue. As the definition of “revenue” changes over the regulatory 
period (e.g., including or not including non-controllable items), it is better to use the 
difference in revenue as measure for customer savings, rather than focusing solely on the X-
Factor. As shown later, it is possible for the X-Factor to be higher than initially, but for the 
total required savings to be smaller. 
 
Example of calculation for Essent  
 
Table 1 shows the allowed revenue in Euros for the three-year period and the actual 
X-Factors as set by DTe in 2000 for the Essent companies. 
 
Table 1: Allowed revenue (DTe 2000 X-Factors) for Essent companies (x 1000 €)  
€x1,000 2000 2001 2002 2003 
X-
Factor 
Essent Brabant 289,907 293,748 297,640 301,584 -1.3% 
Essent Friesland 11,401 10,348 9,393 8,526 9.2% 
Essent Limburg 172,306 171,916 171,528 171,139 0.2% 
Essent 
Maastricht 
12,950 12,439 11,948 11,476 3.9% 
Essent Noord 256,482 249,668 243,035 236,578 2.6% 
Total 743,046 738,120 733,543 729,303 - 
  
Comparing the total revenue for the Essent Group in 2003 with 2000 allows the calculation of 
the effective X-Factor for the three-year period. In this case: 
 
Effective X-Factor = 1-(Rev20003 / Rev2000)(1/3) = 0.6%. Thus the X-Factor is 0.6 procent for the 
Essent Group. The total cumulative revenue reduction (discounted using the regulated 
return of 6.6 percent) for the Essent Group in Euros (x1,000) is: 
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2001/2000 €4,926 
2002/2000 €8,915 
2003/2000 €12,094 
Total  €25,935 
 
The Essent Group has a total of 2.4 million customers, which implies a total discounted 
cumulative saving over the three-year period of €11 per customer.27  
 
The results 
 
In order to calculate the X-Factors and required cost reductions we assume that there 
is no volume growth or growth in the customer base over the regulatory period, as there are 
no individual figures available for the companies. Furthermore, the allowed revenues have 
2000 as starting year and the revenues for the following years are based on 2000 prices. Table 
2 summarises the 2000 X-Factors and total discounted cumulative savings for consumers. 
 
Table 2: 2000 X-Factors  
Company 
Number of 
customers (x 
1,000) 
Starting revenue 
(€ mln.) 
(2000) 
Effective X-
Factor 
Total cum. rev.  
Reduction (€ 
mln.) 
Total cum. 
savings per 
cust. (€) 
Eneco 1,792 484 8.1% 205 114 
Essent 2,374 743 0.6% 26 11 
Nuon 2,656 671 7.7% 270 101 
      
Sector 7,280 2,025 5.1% 511 70 
Note: X-Factor for sector is customer-weighted, according to customer numbers per individual network operator.  
 
From Table 2 it can be seen that the effective customer-weighted average X-Factor for 
the sector was 5.1 percent. This resulted in a total discounted cumulative revenue reduction 
relative to inflation for the sector of €511mln. over a three-year period from 2001-2003.28 Per 
customer this amounts to €70. An average household consuming 3,500 kWh annually pays 
                                                                 
27 See the appendices for the complete underlying data. 
28 In the DTe’s press release announcing the X-Factors (26 September 2000) it refers to an average X-Factor of 5.9 percent for the 
sector, which results in a total saving of €590mln. However, it subsequently had to make some adjustments as it erroneously 
forgot some data from the smaller companies. In addition, the DTe did not discount the cumulative savings, therefore the final 
savings are €511mln. 
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approximately €149 for distribution. That would suggest a total reduction equivalent to 50 
percent of the annual bill over three years.. However, although the customer mix consists 
predominantly of small households, it also consists of large customers. Average revenue per 
customer – based on the 2003 figures from the May 2003 agreement – is €278. That would 
suggest the savings amount to 25 percent. Total revenue for the sector in 2000 was 
approximately €2bn. Remarkable here is the stark difference between the X-Factors for 
Essent and Nuon, two comparable companies. As we will demonstrate later, this causes the 
greatest loss of cost savings for customers. At the time there was also a discussion whether 
these revenue reductions were the elimination of inefficiencies, or whether the reductions 
were attempting to reduce excess profits. This is dependent on the valuation method used 
for the Regulated Asset Base (RAB) and the allowed return on invested capital. In the initial 
results, a substantial component of the revenue reductions was  driven by excess profits, 
however as the RAB calculation methodology changed (and the RAB increased) and the X-
Factor deal was concluded in May 2003, the reductions were less driven by excess returns, 
and more  by operational inefficiencies.      
 
There was substantial criticism of the DTe’s results and most companies (except 
notably Essent) subsequently appealed to the DTe.29 Exactly a year later (September 2001) the 
NMa announced its decision on appeal (2001 X-Factors). Although the DTe officially dealt 
with appeal procedures, the actual handling of the case was given to the legal department of 
the NMa. In these revised X-Factors there were some substantial changes. Firstly, the DTe 
adopted a different approach to calculating the value of regulated assets. Initially, the DTe 
had adopted a clever, but impractical, method to calculate the RAB by discounting the 
regulated profits.30 This method was now replaced by using the companies’ actual historical 
investments and depreciating these using standardised depreciation schedules. Secondly, 
DTe updated the benchmarking data set by removing certain mistakes. However, it did not 
cross-check results and still applied the efficiency scores mechanically to obtain X-Factors. 
Finally, DTe applied the legal principle of no “reformatio in peius”, stating that: 
 
“By virtue of section 7:11, clause 1, of the General Order in Council, the director of 
the DTe is also of the opinion that the party lodging a notice of objection must not, as 
a result, be put in a worse position than if he had not made an objection (principle that 
                                                                 
29 See for example, KPMG BEA (2000), Nillesen & Telling (2001), and NYFER (2001).  
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‘reformatio in peius’ is forbidden). Therefore for a grid operator no more unfavourable 
x must be set than had been set in relation to the primary decision, even if this stems 
from application of the amended regulatory methodology.” DTe (2001) p.36/37   
 
“Furthermore, in the opinion of the director of the DTe the relevant principle (no 
‘reformatio in peius’) applies only with respect to the x-factor as the end result of 
applying the regulatory method, not with respect to any interim result on the basis of 
a step in the method (in that case more favourable interim results for a grid operator 
may be passed on, but not more unfavourable ones). In the final analysis, when the 
decision is made on the objection a grid operator must not be put in a worse position 
than if the grid operator had not made an objection.” DTe (2001) p.36/37  31 
 
As is shown later on, the application of the no reformatio principle allowed Essent to 
benefit from the lenient X-Factor it received in 2000 even though it was later shown that it 
should have been substantially higher. 
 
Table 3 summarises the 2001 X-Factors and total cumulative savings for consumers.  
 
Table 3: 2001 X-Factors 
Company Number of 
customers (x 
1,000) 
Starting 
revenue (€ mln.) 
(2000) 
X-Factor Total cumulative 
revenue  reduction 
(€ mln.) 
Total cumulative 
savings per 
customer (€) 
Eneco 1,792 394 7.0% 146 82 
Essent 2,374 743 0.6% 26 11 
Nuon 2,656 572 7.2% 217 82 
      
Sector 7,280 1,795 4.4% 376 52 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
30 As tariffs were fixed at the 1996=2000 level, all that was required to calculate the RAB was to subtract operational 
expenditures and depreciation charges. The remainder were the regulated profits, which when discounted by the DTe’s 
weighted average cost of capital would give the RAB value.  
31 In its 2001 X-Factor decision DTe states that “Gelet op artikel 7:11, eerste lid, Awb is de directeur DTe verder van oordeel dat 
degene die een bezwaarschrift indient, niet daardoor in een slechtere positie mag worden gebracht dan wanneer hij geen 
bezwaar had gemaakt (beginsel dat reformatio in peius is verboden). Voor een netbeheerder mag dus geen ongunstigere x 
worden vastgestelddan bij het primaire besluit was vastgesteld, ook indien dat uit toepassing van de aangepaste 
reguleringsmethode zou voortvloeien.” And “Overigens geldt naar de mening van de directeur DTe bedoeld beginsel (geen 
reformatio in peius) slechts ten aanzien van de x-factor als eindresultaat van de toepassing van de reguleringsmethode, dus niet 
ten aanzien van ieder tussenresultaat op basis van een stap in de methode (dan zouden voor een netbeheerder gunstigere 
tussenresultaten mogen worden doorgerekend maar ongunstigere niet). Per saldo mag een netbeheerder bij de beslissing op 
bezwaar dus niet in een slechtere positie worden gebracht dan wanneer de netbeheerder geen bezwaar had gemaakt.” DTe 
(2001), p.36/37. 
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From Table 3 it can be seen that the effective 2001 customer-weighted average X-
Factor for the sector is 4.4 percent instead of 5.1 percent in the 2000 decision. The resulting 
total cumulative revenue reduction for the sector – and thus for each customer - dropped 26 
percent to €376mln. The starting revenue in 2001 also differs from the starting revenues in 
2001. This is because in 2001 non-controllable costs, such as e.g. TSO charges, were treated 
separately; and more accurate data became available. 
 
The companies that had appealed the 2000 X-Factor decisions however were still 
unhappy with the results. The benchmarking exercise and its mechanistic application of the 
results were a focal point of their criticisms. The final resort for the companies was to take 
their case to court. Nearly all the companies subsequently lodged their appeals with the CBb. 
During this whole process the 2000 X-Factors still applied.  
 
At the same time that the discussions surrounding the X-Factors for network 
operators was taking place, there were discussions about the X-Factors for retail tariffs. The 
articles describing the methodology for setting the retail tariff X-Factor are exactly the same 
as for network tariffs. As the retail X-Factor was less labour-intensive the appeal procedure 
had run ahead of the X-Factors for networks. One of the retail companies (Rendo) had 
already lodged an appeal against its retail tariffs to the CBb. On 6 February 2002 the CBb 
ruled that DTe had not acted according to the E-Act’s intentions.32 According to the CBb the 
E-Act did not allow DTe to set X-Factors that could vary between individual companies. 
Instead the X-Factor had to be uniform for the sector. In Article 58:1:b the E-Act states that: 
 
“xt = the discount factor to stimulate the efficient operation by retail license 
holders,….”33 
 
This was a substantial blow for the DTe and the ruling was unexpected by the sector.34 This 
was clearly not the intention of the original E-Act and reflected poor drafting. 
 
The DTe announced that same month (February 2002) that it was starting a project 
called “Correctie Besluiten” (corrected decisions). It intended to issue a new request for 
information from the network companies, allowing them to revise and update data (some 
                                                                 
32 College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven (2002a), No AWB 01/623. 
33 The original Dutch Article states: “xt = de korting ter bevordering van de doelmatige bedrijfsvoering door vergunninghouders 
voor zover het betreft de inkoop van elektriciteit en de diensten met betrekking tot de levering van elektriciteit.” 
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data had been estimated as actual figures had not be available at the time of the 2000 X-
Factors). This data set would be then be verified by the companies, before it would be used 
to re-calculate the X-Factors for the period for a third time. Both DTe and companies took 
part in this exercise, attempting to agree on a final dataset.  
 
 During the intermittent period of regulatory uncertainty following the CBb´s 
decision, the DTe published An Overview of the First Regulatory Review of the Regional 
Electricity Networks Business in July 2002.35 The report contains a detailed discussion of the 
role of the regulator and the objectives of DTe. In the introduction the DTe states: 
 
“In particular DTe is keen to demonstrate that each of the decisions it has taken 
during the first regulatory review has been guided by a common set of underlying 
princples.” (DTe, 2002, p.1) 
 
In addition the DTe states that it: “…it would prefer to provide incentives for the 
companies to focus their attention on delivering the best services to customers, rather than debating 
their costs with the regulator.”36 Importantly, the DTe explains why it has chosen the DEA 
benchmarking technique over the other possible methodologies: 
 
“Regression analysis seeks to explain differences in cost on the basis of a range of 
factors. In contrast, DEA evaluates whether observed costs can be regarded as 
reasonable on the basis of the basket of outputs delivered, where the regulator selects 
which outputs are considered valuable. For this reason alone DTe regards DEA as 
better suited for use in a regulatory context.” (DTe, 2002, p.27) 
 
In August 2002 DTe published new X-Factors. These X-Factors were based on the 
project Correctie Besluiten. The results – although never formally implemented – are 
interesting because of their results. Table 4 summarises the 2002 X-Factors and total 
cumulative savings for consumers, it does not include the no “reformatio in peius” for 
Essent.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
34 See for example: Knops (2002), De Pree (2002), De Telegraaf (2002), and Het Financiële Dagblad (2002). 
35 DTe (2002c), An Overview of the First Regulatory Review of the Regional Electricity Networks Business, July 2002, The 
Hague.  
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Table 4: 2002 X-Factors 
Company Number of 
customers (x 
1,000) 
Starting revenue 
(€ mln.) 
(2000) 
X-Factor Total cumulative 
revenue  
reduction (€ 
mln.) 
Total cumulative 
savings per 
customer (€) 
Eneco 1,792 311 4.4% 74 41 
Essent 2,374 584 4.7% 147 62 
Nuon 2,656 465 6.8% 168 63 
      
Sector 7,280 1,463 5.1% 384 53 
 
From Table 4 it can be seen that the effective 2002 customer-weighted average X-
Factor for the sector is 5.1 percent as in the 2000 decision. The resulting total cumulative 
revenue reduction for the sector – and thus for each customer – however only changes 
slightly compared to the reduction from 2001 (an additional €8mln. required saving) and is 
still substantially less than the figure for 2000. This is due to the change in level of allowed 
revenue. The allowed revenue for the sector was €2bn. in the 2000 X-factor but €1.5bn. in the 
2002 X-Factor. The previous two X-Factor decisions were based on estimates, rather than 
actual figures. During the “Correctie Besluiten” actual audited data was available. Therefore, 
although the effective X-Factor is unchanged, the total savings for customers decreases. 
Interestingly the net effect of the 2002 re-calculations is negligible (assuming the no 
reformatio principle is not applied) - but there is a re-distribution between the three large 
companies. Eneco benefits most with a 50 percent reduction in required cost savings when 
compared to 2001. Nuon benefits from a 23 percent reduction, however Essent’s revenue 
reduction has increased more than €121mln. (equivalent to an increase of 466 percent).  
 
The uncertainty over individual versus uniform X-Factors (and the legal basis for 
DTe’s approach) was finally removed when on 13 November 2002 when the CBb ruled that 
the relevant article of the E-Act for setting X-Factors for network operators was to be read in 
the same way as the article for retail tariffs.37 
 
“xt = the discount factor to stimulate the efficient operation by grid operators”38 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
36 DTe (2002c), op. cit. Page 3. 
37 CBb (2002b), No AWB 01/841, 01/847-53, 01/955, 01/956. This did not come as a surprise to either the sector or DTe. In actual 
fact DTe had been preparing for this eventuality during 2002. This is confirmed by the consultation note discussing possible 
solutions published 16 January 2003 by DTe (DTe 2003b). 
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This meant that according to the E-Act DTe only had the legal basis to set a uniform X-Factor 
for the sector and not individually varying X-Factors.39 
 
On 2 December 2002 the DTe announced that the then head of DTe would be 
replaced.40 On 13 December 2002 DTe announced that Gert Zijl would become head of the 
DTe per 1 January 2003. Mr Zijl had until then been CEO of TenneT – the national 
transmission system operator.41  
 
The new Director’s approach to the deadlock was two fold. First, in January 2003 DTe 
published a consultation note setting out DTe’s vision of repairing the X-Factors.42 Second, at 
the same time behind the scenes negotiations took place between DTe and Eneco, Essent, and 
Nuon. After months of negotiating and discussing alternative models, a deal was finally 
presented to all the network operators. After some minor changes the deal was signed on 26 
May 2003.43 The deal covers two regulatory periods, the first from 2001 until 2003 and the 
second period from 2004 until 2006. For the first regulatory period there is a uniform X-
Factor of 3.2 percent, as is legally required. For the second regulatory period however there 
are individual X-Factors. The change in methodology for calculating the X-Factors is a 
substantial move away from the previous three X-Factors. These individual X-Factors are set 
so that all companies converge to the same end point by 31 December 2006, thus achieving a 
major target of DTe: convergence. Therefore, during the second period the tariffs converge to 
the average and supplemental inefficiencies not yet eliminated in the first period, are 
removed.  
 
In the new methodology, the performance of each company is compared to the total 
weighted output factor that incorporates all different tariff levels and types of customer. For 
example, it weights low voltage customers differently than high voltage customers. This 
allows each company to have a “uniform” bill for the services it provides. This is then 
benchmarked and the company that provides most value-for-money is set as the reference 
company. In essence the method is a weighted tariff benchmark against the sector average 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
38 The original Dutch Article states: “xt = de korting ter bevordering van de doelmatige bedrijfsvoering door netbeheerders.” 
39 One of the unfortunate side-effects of the CBb rulings was that the actual X-Factor methodology and underlying 
benchmarking was never tested in a court. Thus, in a sense the legal basis for DTe´s approach to setting the X-Factors, has never 
been verified. 
40 DTe (2002d), Directeur De Jong stapt over naar Europees platform energietoezichthouders, press release, 2 December 2002, 
The Hague.  
41 DTe (2002e), Gert Zijl nieuwe directeur DTe, press release, 13 December 2002, The Hague.  
42 DTe (2003b), Consultatienotitie: Reparatie X-Factor Netbeheerders Elektriciteit, Visie DTe, The Hague, 16 January 2003. 
43 A similar deal was signed in November 2003 with the gas network operators after several months of intense discussions. 
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tariffs. This methodology is in some aspects superior to the original approach. Therefore, 
although the benefits to customers may be smaller than initially communicated in the 2000 X-
Factors, it is likely that this outcome more accurately reflects the underlying efficiency 
potential. 
 
It is important to note that during these negotiations the Minister for Economic 
Affairs prepared emergency legislation to repair the loophole in the current E-Act. A first 
draft of this legislation was first published on 10 April 2003 (Overgangswet 
Elektriciteitsproductiesector44). This reparation would allow the DTe to set individual X-
Factors and importantly also do this retrospectively (and backdate the X-Factors), allowing 
DTe to effectively re-take its decisions and ignore the CBb ruling. In the final version, the 
amended E-Act states in Article 41a:1:a: 
 
“With regard to the proposal, as mentioned in Article 41:b, the director of DTe sets for 
each individual grid operator, for a period of three to five years, the following: 
a. the discount factor to stimulate efficient operation…” 45 
 
The final bill was enacted on 19 August 2003, only after – among other things – the 
Minister promised the Upper Chamber not to make use of the retrospectivity of the Act.  
 
Table 5 summarises the final 2003 X-Factors and total cumulative savings for 
consumers. 
 
Table 5: The Final 2003 X-Factors 
Company Number of 
customers (x 
1,000) 
Starting 
revenue (€ 
mln.) 
(2000) 
X-Factor Total cumulative 
revenue  reduction 
(€ mln.) 
Total cumulative 
savings per 
customer (€) 
Eneco 1,792 482 3.2% 83 46 
Essent 2,374 742 3.2% 128 54 
Nuon 2,656 657 3.2% 114 43 
      
Sector 7,280 2,021 3.2% 349 48 
                                                                 
44 The abbreviation for this Act, which repairs a substantial amount of previous legislation, is ironically “Oeps”!  
45 The original dutch Article states: “Ten behoeve van het voorstel, bedoeld in artikel 41b, stelt de directeur van de dienst voor 
iedere netbeheerder afzonderlijk voor een periode van ten minste drie en ten hoogste vijf jaar vast: 
a. de korting ter bevordering van de doelmatige bedrijfsvoering.” 
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From Table 5 it can be seen that the final effective 2003 customer-weighted average X-
Factor for the sector is 3.2 percent instead of 5.1 percent in the initial 2000 decision. The 
resulting final total cumulative revenue reduction for the sector dropped 32 percent to 
€349mln. when compared to the initial decision in 2000. Whereas initially in 2000 the 
customer was promised a reduction of €70 over the three-year period, after three years of 
appeals and court cases, the final saving was €48. The sector revenue in the 2003 X-Factor 
includes non-controllable expenditures, as in the 2000 X-Factor. 
 
However, DTe was forced to apply the no “reformatio in peius” principle as it had 
itself proposed in 2001. In practice this meant that if companies were still owed money they 
were allowed to recover this through their tariffs, whereas those that earned too much were 
not required to reimburse customers.46 Therefore, in Table 6 we adjust Table 5 to 
demonstrate the actual effect for customers applying the no reformatio principle to the 2001 
X-Factors. In order to calculate the impact of the no reformatio we compare the total 
cumulative savings under the 2003 X-Factor with the total savings under X-Factor in 2001. If 
the total savings are greater in 2003 than in 2001, we use the 2001 revenue stream. Although 
these numbers are not directly comparable, they generate the correct total required savings. 
 
Table 6: Final 2003 X-Factors including no Reformatio in peius based on X-Factor 2001 
Company Number of 
customers (x 
1,000) 
Starting 
revenue (€ mln.) 
(2000) 
Effective X-
Factor 
Total cumulative 
revenue  reduction 
(€ mln.) 
Total cumulative 
savings per 
customer (€) 
Eneco 1,792 482 3.2% 83 46 
Essent 2,374 743 0.6% 26 11 
Nuon 2,656 657 3.2% 114 43 
      
Sector 7,280 1,970 2.0% 209 29 
 
 From Table 6 it can be clearly seen that the actual final effective 2003 customer-
weighted average X-Factor for the sector is 2.0 percent instead of 3.2 percent, as a result of 
the application of no reformatio in peius using the 2001 X-Factors. Thus, the actual savings 
for customers from the first regulatory period is not €70 (or €48), but only €29 – a reduction 
of 60 percent compared to the initial X-Factor decision in 2000. This is the result of allowing 
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companies to keep excess revenues from X-Factors that were too mild, and allowing 
companies to recoup lost revenue as a result of previously harsher X-Factors.  
  
 Table 7 summarises the four final effective X-Factors set during the first regulatory 
period. Note that the X-Factors are not directly comparable as they are based on different 
revenue streams and definition of costs. It is therefore more useful to focus on total revenue 
reductions. This table is therefore purely illustrative. 
 
Table 7: X-Factors for the first regulatory period 
Company X 2000 X 2001 X 2002 X 2003 
Eneco 8.1% 7.0%              4.4% 3.2% 
Essent 0.6% 0.6%              4.7% 0.6% 
Nuon 7.7% 7.2%              6.8% 3.2% 
     
Sector 5.1% 4.4% 5.1% 2.0% 
 
Table 8 summarises the required revenue reductions under the four different X-Factor 
decisions during the first regulatory period.  
 
Table 8: Revenue reductions from starting year 2000, as a result of different X-Factors during first 
regulatory period 
Company X 2000 
€ mln. 
X 2001 
€ mln. 
X 2002 
€ mln. 
X 2003 
€ mln. 
% change 2000-
2003 
Eneco 205 146 74 83 -59% 
Essent 26 26 147 26 0% 
Nuon 270 217 168 114 -58% 
      
Sector 511 376 384 209 -59% 
 
 Table 8 summarises the result of the protracted X-Factor setting process in the Dutch 
electricity distribution sector. Whereas DTe initially publicised a total saving of €511mln. for 
the sector in September 2000 (around 25 percent of the total revenue for the sector in 2000), 
the final result in May 2003 was nearly 60 percent less. Essent benefited most from the 
revision of the X-Factors, having been particularly fortunate with a low X-Factor in 
September 2000 and falling under the no reformatio principle. This allowed them to pass 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
46 However, from 1 January 2004 all companies will start from the adjusted starting point taking the full 3.2 percent X-Factor 
 27 
through €26mln. in tariff reductions, whereas that figure should have been closer to €128mln. 
based on the 2003 X-Factors without the no reformatio. Eneco and Nuon also benefited from 
the revision of the X-Factors. Both companies saw a reduction of nearly 60 percent in 
required savings. 
 
IV. The experience in context: conclusions and lessons 
 
It is important to stress that the Dutch price review process has been unusually bad 
and compares unfavourably to other price reviews that regularly take place in for example 
the UK, Norway, Australia, and Chile. 
 
The regulatory failure was caused by a number of factors. The first and ultimately the 
most important was the badly drafted legislation. The wording of the original E-Act did not 
clearly state whether a single X-Factor had to be set for the sector, or whether the X-Factors 
could vary per individual company. However the poor drafting might not have been legally 
tested if the DTe had been more successful in its calculations of X-Factors. Second, the DTe 
was much too ambitious in its original timetable. It had less than 18 months from its first 
consultation document to the beginning of the new X-Factors. It should have either given 
itself longer or it should have set undemanding uniform X-Factors for the first three years 
and concentrated on getting things right from 1 January 2004. This would have been possible 
within the E-Act. Third, once committed to the timetable the DTe failed to discuss the 
process sufficiently with the companies and to follow up its initial approach in the July 1999 
document. The result was an increasingly adversarial relationship and a loss of confidence in 
the process early on. This was clearly unnecessary given the usually consensual nature of the 
Dutch system. This made the companies reluctant to cooperate with data collection efforts 
and given the size of the tariff reductions, made companies take a more litigious approach to 
protect their revenue streams through the courts. At one point there were over 300 
appeal/court cases running with DTe. The companies themselves were also badly prepared 
and only engaged specialists and consultants at a late stage to help them understand the 
dynamics of the regulatory process and the seriousness of its implications for company asset 
values. Fourth, the mistakes that were made in the first round of X-Factors in 2000 haunted 
the DTe right through to the final deal with the sector in 2003. These were compounded by 
the application of the no reformatio principle, which essentially allowed companies to retain 
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favourable, though potentially erroneous X-Factors. Yet DTe was required to compensate 
those network operators that should have received more favourable X-Factors. Finally, 
customers lost out on €300mln. in cost savings. In addition there is little reason for 
confidence in the distribution of price reductions between the companies as indicated by the 
difference between the actual and calculated X-Factors for Essent. 
 
Relative to the value of the electricity network assets, the consequences for consumer 
welfare are only marginal. Bosma, Mahieu & Nillesen (2003) estimate the sector value at 
approximately €6.5bln. based on DTe´s 2001 Regulated Asset Base data. According to the 
deal in 2003 the total asset value for the sector was €9.1bln. Therefore, a loss of savings of 
€300mln. amounts to 3~5 percent of the total value of the sector. Furthermore, Domah and 
Pollitt (2001) suggest that the timing of cost reductions in UK electricity distribution is 
strongly correlated with the timing and strength of X-Factors. This would suggest that 
implementation of delayed and lower than expected final X-Factors in The Netherlands may 
well have blunted incentives to cut costs and resulted in losses to society.  
 
As a direct result of these regulatory failures, the debate around liberalisation and 
regulation has become more politicised. During the review of the E-Act and Gas Act, it was 
concluded that the DTe needed further powers to regulate the sector. In the Interventiewet 
the DTe will be granted further powers, such as the ability to levy fines of up to 10 percent of 
group revenue. As a result of the Interventiewet the network operator will also have balance 
sheet control over the network assets.47 This will allow the network operator to finance its 
activities itself, rather than rely on a holding company for financing (which also finances 
commercial non-regulated businesses). Although these measures go beyond the 
requirements of the new EU Energy Directive, the sector and other third parties welcomed 
them. However, in addition to this Act, the Minister for Economic Affairs announced his 
vision of the future of the energy sector. It is the Minister’s intention to fully separate the 
companies into a commercial company that can be sold to private parties, and a regulated 
network company that should remain (initially) in public hands. The split would need to be 
effective by 1 January 2007. In the document the Minister states that this will guarantee the 
independence of the network operator and avoid any abuse by a holding company to favour 
– either financially or physically – the commercial activities.48  
                                                                 
47 This particular Article in the Act will not be implemented pending the discussion surrounding the Minister’s plans to force 
ownership unbundling.  
48 See for example, Pollitt (2004). 
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It seems that although the companies were successful in fighting the DTe and 
lowering their required cost reductions, this “win” and regulatory failure by DTe has 
resulted to some effect in the draconian measures sought by the legislative body to combat 
the perceived weaknesses of DTe. The forced ownership unbundling at the distribution level 
has not been implemented elsewhere and it is not clear that the benefits of this proposed 
structural remedy will weigh up against the possible costs associated with it. The evidence of 
ownership unbundling elsewhere around the world at distribution level is that it has been 
left to the market, rather than imposed through legislation. The sector estimates the total cost 
of unbundling at €1.5bn. This includes one-off costs from e.g. the renegotiation of cross-
border leases and duplication of IT systems, and includes the structural loss of synergies, 
such as jointly using call centres and corporate staff.49 Even a fraction of this cost would still 
imply substantial welfare losses from a forced unbundling of the networks from the 
commercial non-regulated activities.  
 
The ultimate result of the companies successfully acquiring €300mln. of extra revenue 
may be therefore have been greater regulatory uncertainty and substantially reduced asset 
sale prices (from foreign investors) when the network companies are eventually privatised. 
 
The Dutch experience illustrates that in price control reviews that make use of 
benchmarking exercises in setting X-Factors a certain amount of give and take is very 
important for the achievement of both parties´ objectives. In this case hard nosed bargaining 
led to consumers losing and shareholders gaining extra revenue in the short run. The image 
of the deregulated industry in the Netherlands has been tarnished, which is bad for both 
parties. Other countries, with much less of a history of consensual regulation, have managed 
similar price control reviews with more success. 
 
                                                                 
49 Calculations by the sector in a position paper (see Nuon 2004) estimate the total value loss from a forced split -up at €1.5bn. 
This incorporates operational costs and cross-border lease renegotiation costs:  
i) €175mln. IT investments; 
ii) €25mln. p.a. operational costs valued at 6.6%; 
iii) €20mln. p.a. extra corporate staffing valued at 6.6%; 
iv) €40mln. refinancing costs; 
v) €110mln. for three-year additional call centre capacity; and  
vi) €500mln. cross-border lease renegotiation costs. 
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 There have also been a number of reviews of regulatory structures that have 
performed well. In general eight characteristic features can be detected50: 
 
i) Clarity: regulatory objectives, roles and requirements should be clear and 
understandable; 
ii) Proportionality: actions or decisions taken by the regulator are proportional 
to the specific regulatory objective or risk; 
iii) Consistency: regulatory actions are predictable, rational, and uniform; 
iv) Transparency: regulatory process is open and accessible; 
v) Independence: regulatory process should be independent of all stakeholders 
in regulatory process; 
vi) Accountability: regulator should be independent, but accountable for his 
actions, through e.g. an appeals court; 
vii) Effectiveness and efficiency: regulatory process should have a positive trade-
off between benefits and costs; and 
viii) Flexibility: regulatory process should be consistent and predictable, but 
should be able to evolve with changing market circumstances. 
 
Current reviews of the regulatory process in the Netherlands should attempt to learn 
from past mistakes. The DTe’s powers need to be strengthened and a more consesual 
approach should be applied by all parties involved in the regulatory process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
50 For a discussion see Eurelectric (2004). 
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Appendix 1: Allowed Revenue 2000 (2000 prices) 
Company 
Allowed Rev. 
(x1,000 €) 2000 
Allowed Rev. 
(x1,000 €) 2001 
Allowed Rev. 
(x1,000 €) 2002 
Allowed Rev. 
(x1,000 €) 2003 
(Effective) X-
Factor  
Customers 
(x1,000) 
Delta 57,933 58,897 59,878 60,875 -1.6% 196 
Remu (Eneco) 137,207  125,727  115,208  105,569  8.3% 494 
Eneco 277,704 255,427  234,937  216,091  8.0% 1,062 
Eneco Delfland  37,450 34,022 30,908 28,079 9.1% 118 
Eneco EZK 2,814 2,559 2,327 2,116 9.0% 12 
Eneco Gouda 24,053 22,404 20,869 19,439 6.8% 86 
Eneco Weert 4,784 4,733 4,691 4,649 0.5% 19 
Eneco 484,012  444,873  408,940 375,942  8.0% 1,792 
NRE 23,662 22,517 21,426 20,388 4.8% 99 
Essent Brabant 289,907  293,748  297,640  301,584  -1.3% 938 
Essent Friesland  11,401 10,348 9,393 8,526 9.2% 45 
Essent Limburg 172,306  171,916  171,528  171,139  0.2% 456 
Essent Maastricht 12,950 12,439 11,948 11,476 3.9% 45 
Essent Noord 256,482  249,668  243,035  236,578  2.6% 888 
Essent 743,046  738,120  733,543  729,303  0.6% 2,374 
Cogas 10,560 10,127 9,711 9,312 4.1% 50 
Nuon 670,858  619,495  572,065  528,266  7.6% 2,656 
ONS 8,721 7,897 7,151 6,475 9.4% 38 
Rendo 7,352 6,819 6,326 5,868 7.2% 29 
Westland 18,580 18,408 18,237 18,068 0.9% 47 
Total 2,024,726  1,927,154  1,837,277  1,754,496  5.1% 7,280 
       
Discount Factor - 1.0  0.938 0.880   
       
Total Savings (x1,000 
€) 
 97,572 187,449  270,229   511,218  
Savings per customer 
(€) 
     €70 
       
Eneco: savings  39,139 70,424 95,103  204,666  
Eneco: cust      €114 
Essent: savings  4,926 8,915 12,094  25,935 
Essent: cust      €11 
Nuon: savings  51,363 92,677 125,482   269,522  
Nuon: cust      €101 
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Appendix 2: Allowed Revenue 2001 (2000 prices) 
Company 
Allowed Rev. 
(x1,000 €) 2000 
Allowed Rev. 
(x1,000 €) 2001 
Allowed Rev. 
(x1,000 €) 2002 
Allowed Rev. 
(x1,000 €) 2003 
(Effective) X-
Factor  
Customers  
(x1,000) 
Delta 45,106 47,045 49,068 51,178 -4.3% 196 
Remu (Eneco) 122,589  114,621  107,171  100,205  6.5% 494 
Eneco 221,391  204,122  188,201  173,521  7.8% 1,062 
Eneco Delfland  27,427 25,589 23,875 22,275 6.7% 118 
Eneco EZK 1,858 1,711 1,576 1,451 7.9% 12 
Eneco Gouda 18,280 17,676 17,093 16,529 3.3% 86 
Eneco Weert 2,789 2,806 2,823 2,839 -0.6% 19 
Eneco 394,333  366,526  340,738  316,821  7.0% 1,792 
NRE 14,052 13,434 12,843 12,278 4.4% 99 
Essent Brabant 289,907  293,748  297,640  301,584  -1.3% 938 
Essent Friesland  11,401 10,348 9,393 8,526 9.2% 45 
Essent Limburg 172,306  171,916  171,528  171,139  0.2% 456 
Essent Maastricht 12,950 12,439 11,948 11,476 3.9% 45 
Essent Noord 256,482  249,668  243,035  236,578  2.6% 888 
Essent 743,046  738,120  733,543  729,303  0.6% 2,374 
Cogas 6,486 6,557 6,629 6,702 -1.1% 50 
Nuon 571,945  530,765  492,550  457,086  7.2% 2,656 
ONS 6,891 6,402 5,947 5,525 7.1% 38 
Rendo 3,845 4,111 4,394 4,698 -6.9% 29 
Westland 9,698 10,717 11,842 13,085 -10.5% 47 
Total 1,795,403  1,723,676  1,657,554  1,596,676  4.4% 7,280 
       
Discount Factor - 1.0  0.938 0.880   
       
Total Savings (x1,000 
€) 
 71,727 137,849  198,727   375,922  
Savings per customer 
(€) 
     €52 
       
Eneco: savings  27,808 50,277 68,212  146,297  
Eneco: cust      €82 
Essent: savings  4,926 8,915 12,094  25,935 
Essent: cust      €11 
Nuon: savings  41,180 74,479 101,076   216,736  
Nuon: cust      €82 
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Appendix 3: Allowed Revenue 2002 (2000 prices) 
Company 
Allowed Rev. 
(x1,000 €) 2000 
Allowed Rev. 
(x1,000 €) 2001 
Allowed Rev. 
(x1,000 €) 2002 
Allowed Rev. 
(x1,000 €) 2003 
(Effective) X-
Factor  
Customers 
(x1,000) 
Delta 59,555 61,402 63,305 65,268 -3.1% 196 
Remu (Eneco) 122,406  121,917  121,429  120,943  0.4% 494 
Eneco 148,520  136,935  126,254  116,407  7.8% 1,062 
Eneco Delfland  19,504 18,120 16,833 15,638 7.1% 118 
Eneco EZK 1,661 1,545 1,436 1,336 7.0% 12 
Eneco Gouda 16,521 16,141 15,770 15,407 2.3% 86 
Eneco Weert 2,685 2,644 2,605 2,566 1.5% 19 
Eneco 311,297  297,301  284,327  272,296  4.4% 1,792 
NRE 13,942 12,924 11,981 11,106 7.3% 99 
Essent Brabant 224,474  217,291  210,337  203,606  3.2% 938 
Essent Friesland  8,249 7,630 7,058 6,529 7.5% 45 
Essent Limburg 136,344  126,936  118,178  110,024  6.9% 456 
Essent Maastricht 7,459 6,885 6,355 5,865 7.7% 45 
Essent Noord 207,508  197,755  188,460  179,603 4.7% 888 
Essent 584,034  556,497  530,388  505,627  4.7% 2,374 
Cogas 6,539 7,219 7,969 8,798 -10.4% 50 
Continuon 212,022  199,089  186,945  175,541  6.1% - 
EWR 42,344 39,464 36,781 34,280 6.8% - 
NWN 210,299  194,316  179,548  165,902  7.6% - 
Nuon 464,665  432,869 403,273  375,723  6.8% 2,656 
ONS 5,277 4,897 4,544 4,217 7.2% 38 
Rendo 4,525 4,661 4,801 4,945 -3.0% 29 
Westland 13,058 12,300 11,587 10,915 5.8% 47 
Total 1,462,890  1,390,070  1,322,175  1,258,894  5.1% 7,280 
       
Discount Factor - 1.0  0.938 0.880   
       
Total Savings (x1,000 
€) 
 72,821 140,715  203,996   384,342  
Savings per customer 
(€) 
     €53 
       
Eneco: savings  13,996 25,300 34,321  73,616 
Eneco: cust      €41 
Essent: savings  27,537 50,324 68,999  146,860  
Essent: cust      €62 
Nuo n: savings  31,795 57,590 78,269  167,655  
Nuon: cust      €63 
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Appendix 4: Allowed Revenue 2003 including Reformatio in Peius (2000 prices) 
Company 
Allowed Rev. 
(x1,000 €) 2000 
Allowed Rev. 
(x1,000 €) 2001 
Allowed Rev. 
(x1,000 €) 2002 
Allowed Rev. 
(x1,000 €) 2003 
(Effective) X-
Factor  
Customers 
(x1,000) 
Delta 65,563 63,465 61,434 59,468 3.2% 196 
Eneco 481,827  466,408  451,483  437,036  3.2% 1,792 
NRE 24,928 24,130 23,358 22,611 3.2% 99 
Essent 741,851  718,112  695,133  672,888  3.2% 2,374 
Cogas 10,228 9,900 9,539 9,277 3.2% 50 
Nuon 657,233  636,201  615,843  596,136  3.2% 2,656 
ONS 8,348 8,081 7,822 7,572 3.2% 38 
Rendo 7,063 6,837 6,618 6,406 3.2% 29 
Westland 24,304 23,527 22,774 22,045 3.2% 47 
Including No 
Reformatio* 
      
Delta 45,106 47,045 49,068 51,178 -4.3% 196 
Eneco 481,827  466,408  451,483  437,036  3.2% 1,792 
NRE 14,052 13,434 12,843 12,278 4.4% 99 
Essent 743,046  738,120  733,543  729,303  0.6% 2,374 
Cogas 6,486 6,557 6,629 6,702 -1.1% 50 
Nuon 657,233  636,201  615,843  596,136  3.2% 2,656 
ONS 8,348 8,081 7,822 7,572 3.2% 38 
Rendo 3,845 4,111 4,394 4,698 -6.9% 29 
Westland 9,698 10,717 11,842 13,085 -10.5% 47 
Total 1,969,641  1,930,674  1,893,468  1,857,987  2.0% 7,260 
       
       
Discount Factor - 1.0  0.938 0.880   
       
Total Savings (x1,000 
€) 
 38.967 76.173 111.654   208,680  
Savings per customer 
(€) 
     €29 
       
Eneco: savings  15,418 28,465 39,416  83,300 
Eneco: cust      €46 
Essent: savings  4,926 8,915 12,094  25,935 
Essent: cust      €11 
Nuon: savings  21,031 38,827 53,766  113,624  
Nuon: cust      €43 
*Note: If the total cumulative savings under X-2003 are greater than under X-2001 we apply the no reformatio principle. The 
allowed revenues 2001 are then entered into the table. Although these numbers are not directly comparable, they generate the 
correct total required savings. 
 
